Abstract: We provide a Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). Our result subsumes prior existence results of Nishimura and Friedman (1981) and Novshek (1985) that are not covered by his theorem.
Introduction
Many important and famous games in economics (e.g, the Hotelling location game, Bertrand competition, Cournot competition with fixed costs, and various auction models) have discontinuous payoffs, and consequently do not satisfy the hypotheses of Nash's existence proof or its infinite dimensional generalizations, but nonetheless have a nonempty set of pure Nash equilibria. Using an argument that is quite ingenious and involved, Reny (1999) establishes a result that explains equilibrium existence for many such examples, and which has been applied in novel settings many times since then. (See for example Monteiro and Page (2007) and Monteiro and Page (2008) .) His theorem's hypotheses are simple and weak, and in many cases easy to verify.
As Reny explains, many earlier results can be obtained as corollaries of his result. However, he describes the results of Nishimura and Friedman (1981) and Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976) as seemingly having a different character. In this paper we provide a generalization of Reny's theorem that implies both the Nishimura and Friedman result and the two firm case of an existence result of Novshek (1985) , which is the most refined result asserting existence of Cournot equilibrium in the stream of literature following Roberts and Sonnenschein. In both cases the arguments are considerably simpler than those in the original papers. Our method of proof of our main result is also novel, yielding a demonstration that is straightforward and brief, at least in comparison with Reny's.
The next section reviews Reny's theorem and states a result whose hypotheses are less restrictive than Reny's, but more restrictive than Theorem 3.3, which suffices to imply the Nihimura-Friedman existence theorem. Section 3 states Theorem 3.3, which is our main result. In Section 4 we show that Theorem 3.3 implies Novshek's result, that there in a pure Nash equilibrium in his variant of the Cournot model, in the case of two firms. Section 5 gives the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Preliminaries: Reny and Nishimura-Friedman
Our system of notation is largely taken from Reny (1999) . There is a fixed normal form game with N players, which is a 2N -tuple
where, for each i = 1, . . . , N , X i is a non-empty set called the i-th player's strategy set and each u i is a function from the set of strategy profiles X =
We assume throughout that u is bounded. For x ∈ X let A(x) be the set of α ∈ R n such that (x, α) is in the closure of the graph of u. Since u is bounded, each A(x) is compact. We also assume throughout that each X i is a nonempty compact convex subset of a topological vector space, and X is endowed with the product topology. Unless otherwise indicated, all topological notions refer to the relative topology of X. We adopt the usual notation for "all players other than i." Let X −i = j =i X j . If x ∈ X is given, x −i denotes the projection of x on X −i . For each x −i ∈ X −i (or x ∈ X) and y i ∈ X i we write (y i , x −i ) for the strategy profile z ∈ X satisfying z i = y i and z j = x j if j = i. A Nash equilibrium of G is a point x * ∈ X satisfying u i (x * ) ≥ u i (y i , x * −i ) for all i and all y i ∈ X i . We now review Reny's theorem, to provide a context for the conditions we introduce. For each player i let B i : X × R ։ X i be the set valued mapping
That is, there is some y i ∈ X i such that u i (y i , z −i ) ≥ α i for all z ∈ U . The game G is better reply secure at x ∈ X if, for any α ∈ A(x), there is some player i and ε > 0 such that player i can secure α i + ε at x. The game G is better reply secure if it is better reply secure on every strategy profile that is not a Nash equilibrium. Theorem 2.2 (Reny (1999) ). Suppose that for each i and each x −i ∈ X −i the function u i (·, x −i ) : X i → R is quasiconcave. If G is better reply secure, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
To better understand Reny's result in the context of this note we restate his condition.
Definition 2.3. The game is A-secure at x ∈ X if there is α ∈ R N and ε > 0 such that: (a) every player i can secure α i + ε at x; (b) there is a neighborhood U of x such that for any z ∈ U there exists some player i with
Lemma 2.4. For x ∈ X the game is better reply secure at x if and only if it is A-secure at x.
Proof. For each x ∈ X let τ x be a neighborhood base of x. For each i define the function u i : X → R as follows:
This function is automatically lower semicontinuous as a function of the strategies of the other players. For each i and x −i ∈ X −i let
As the pointwise supremum of a collection of lower semicontinuous functions, δ i is lower semicontinuous. Notice that each α i < δ i (x −i ) can be strongly secured by player i at x.
Fixing an x, assume that the game is better reply secure at x. Then for each α ∈ A(x) there is some player i such that δ i (x −i ) > α i , which implies that δ i (x −i ) > α ′ i + ε hold for some ε > 0 and all α ′ in some neighborhood of α. Since A(x) is compact, it is covered by finitely many such neighborhoods so there is ε > 0 such that whenever α ∈ A(x) there exists some player i such that
Since τ x is a directed set (ordered by reverse inclusion) the compactness of the closure of the range of u implies that there is a convergent subnet, so there is α ′ ∈ A(x) such that α ′ i ≥ α i = δ i (x −i ) − ε/2 for all i. This is impossible, so we conclude that the game is A-secure at x.
Assume that the game is A-secure at x, with α, ε and U as in the definition. If we replace α with α + (ε/2, . . . , ε/2), then replace ε with ε/2, it will still be the case that each player can secure α i + ε, but now for each z ∈ U there is some i such that u i (z) < α i − ε. For each α ′ ∈ A(x) there is some i with α ′ i ≤ α i − ε, and this i can secure α ′ + ε at x, so the game is better reply secure at x.
For each i let C i : X × R ։ X i be the set valued mapping
Part (a) of the following definition is more easily satisfied than its analogue above. On the other hand, in part (b) we replace B i (z, α i ) with C i (z, α i ), which makes it harder to satisfy, but
is quasiconcave, so the net effect is to make the hypotheses of Proposition 2.6 below (which is a relatively simple special case of Theorem 3.3) weaker than those of Theorem 2.2.
Definition 2.5. The game is B-secure at x ∈ X if there is α ∈ R N such that: (a) every player i can secure α i at x; (b) there is a neighborhood U of x such that for any z ∈ U there exists some player i with
Proposition 2.6. If the game is B-secure at each x ∈ X that is not a Nash equilibrium, then G has a Nash equilibrium. Nishimura and Friedman (1981) prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium when each X i is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Euclidean space, u is continuous (but not necessarily quasiconcave) and for any x that is not a Nash equilibrium there is an agent i, a coordinate index k, and an open nieghborhood U of x, such that
ik ) > 0 whenever x 1 , x 2 ∈ U and y 1 i and y 2 i are best responses for i to x 1 and x 2 respectively. Using compactness, and the continuity of u i , it is not difficult to show that this is equivalent to y ik > x ik for all best responses y i to x. A more general condition that does not depend on the coordinate system is that there is a hyperplane that strictly separates x i from the set of i's best responses to x.
We now show that G satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2.6 when it satisfies the hypotheses of Nishimura and Friedman's result. Consider an x ∈ X that is not a Nash equilibrium. For each j = 1, . . . , N let β j be the utility for j when other agents play their components of x −j and j plays a best response to x. Since u is continuous, for any ε > 0 player j can secure β j − ε at x by playing such a best response. For any neighborhood V of B i (x, β i ) it is the case that B i (x, β i − ε) ⊂ V when ε is sufficiently small, and in turn it follows that there is a neighborhood U of x such that B i (z, β i − ε) ⊂ V for all z ∈ U . It follows that if there is a hyperplane strictly separating x i from B i (x, β i ), then for sufficiently small ε > 0 and a sufficiently small neighborhood U of x there is a hyperplane strictly separating z i and B i (z, β i − ε) for all z ∈ U , in which case z i / ∈ C i (z, β i ). Setting α = (β 1 − ε, . . . , β N − ε) gives the required property.
The Main Result
Roughly, the idea of Reny's theorem is to exploit properties of the "better reply correspondence." The refinement that allows us to subsume Novshek's theorem is a matter of pointing out that it is enough if some subcorrespondence enjoys the relevant properties.
For each i let X i : X ։ X i be a given set valued mapping and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X N ). We call X a restriction operator. We say that X is universal if X i (x) = X i for all x ∈ X. Fix a restriction operator X . For each i define the set valued mappings
In addition to taking advantage of the restriction operator, the next definition incorporates one more refinement of A-security: we allow a different strategy to be used in response to each element of a finite closed cover of a neighborhood of the given strategy.
Definition 3.1. Player i can X -secure a payoff α i ∈ R at x ∈ X if there is a finite closed cover F 1 , . . . , F J of a neighborhood of x such that for each j we have
Definition 3.2. The game G is X -secure at x ∈ X if there is α ∈ R N and a neighborhood U of x such that (1) Each player i can X -secure α i at x.
(2) For any z ∈ U there is some player i for whom z i / ∈ C X i (z, α i ).
As in Reny (1999) X need not be a Hausdorff space. Thus, for x ∈ X the set {x} need not be closed, and we write [x] for the closure of {x}. The game G is restrictionally secure if there is a restriction operator X such that the game is X -secure at any x ∈ X such that [x] does not contain a Nash equilibrium. Our main theorem is: Theorem 3.3. The game G is restrictionally secure if and only if it has a Nash equilibrium.
Novshek's Cournot Model
We now explain the variant of the Cournot duopoly model considered in Novshek (1985) , for the case of two firms, and show that Theorem 3.3 implies that it has an equilibrium. Consider the market for a single homogeneous good with inverse demand function P : R → R + and two firms with cost functions C 1 , C 2 : R → R + .
We assume that P is continuous and that C 1 , C 2 are lower semicontinuous. The payoff function of firm i is its profit:
This function is upper semicontinuous, and for a given y i it is continuous as a function of y −i . A Nash equilibrium of this game is called a Cournot Equilibrium.
For each i the reaction mapping r i : R ։ R is the set valued mapping.
The assumptions on C 1 , C 2 , and P imply that r i has a closed graph. We assume that there is a number Q * such that setting y i = 0 gives a larger payoff than playing any quantity greater than or equal to Q * . It follows that for each i andn y −i , r i (y −i ) is nonempty and compact. Let The key assumption is that if Novshek (1985) discusses assumptions on the cost and inverse demand functions that imply this.
Since our goal is to show that a Cournot equilibrium exists, there is no loss of generality in assuming there are no Cournot equilibria in which one of the firms produces nothing. What this means concretely is that 0 is not a best response for either firm to the other firm's maximal monopoly output: r We will say that (y 1 , y 2 ) is a quasiequilibrium if r − 1 (y 2 ) ≤ y 1 ≤ r + 1 (y 2 ) and r − 2 (y 1 ) ≤ y 2 ≤ r + 2 (y 1 ). For each i the correspondence mapping y −i to the convex hull of r i (y −i ) is upper semicontinuous with compact range, and the set of quasiequilibria is compact because it is the intersection of the graphs of these two correspondences. Kakutani's fixed point theorem implies that this set is nonempty. If (y ′ 1 , y ′ 2 ) is a second quasiequilibrium with y ′ 1 > y 1 , then y ′ 2 ≤ y 2 (if y ′ 2 = y 2 , then r + 2 (y 1 ) = y 2 = y ′ 2 = r − 2 (y ′ 1 )) and this holds also with the two agents reversed, so there is a quasiequilibrium y * such that y 1 ≤ y * 1 and y 2 ≥ y * 2 for all quasiequilibria (y 1 , y 2 ).
\ Ω be the complement of Ω, and let Ω • and ∂Ω be the interior and the boundary of Ω, respectively, in the relative topology of [0, Q * ] 2 . We define the restriction operator X = (X 1 , X 2 ) by setting
if y ∈ Ω and y 1 = Q * , {Q * } if y ∈ Ω and y 1 = Q * and
if y ∈ Ω and y 2 = 0, {0} if y ∈ Ω and y 2 = 0.
We now need to show that the game is X -secure. Fix y ∈ [0, Q * ] 2 , which we assume is not a Nash equilibrium. First suppose that y ∈ Ω • . Since Ω • is open we can choose an open neighborhood U ⊂ Ω • of y. If α 1 and α 2 are lower bounds for u 1 and u 2 on [0, Q * ] 2 , then each i can secure α i at y. In addition, (Q * , 0) / ∈ Ω, so either y 1 < Q * , in which case z 1 / ∈ X 1 (z) = (z 1 , Q * ] for all z ∈ U (proviided U is sufficiently small) or y 2 > 0, in which case z 2 / ∈ X 2 (z) = [0, z 2 ) for all z ∈ U . Thus the game is X -secure at y.
Next suppose that y ∈ Ω c . Since y is not a quasiequilibrium it must be the case that y 1 < r − 1 (y 2 ), y 1 > r + 1 (y 2 ), y 2 < r − 2 (y 1 ), or y 2 > r + 2 (y 1 ). In each of the four cases it is easy to choose an α such that each i can secure α i at y and for one i we have z i / ∈ C i (z, α i ) for all z in some neighborhood of y, so that the game is X -secure at y.
The remaining case is that y ∈ ∂Ω. We may assume that y * is not a Nash equilibrium, so either u 1 (y * ) < u 1 (r
The argument in the other case is similar.)
First suppose that y 1 < r + 1 (y * 2 ). Then we can choose α 1 slightly below the payoff agent 1 receives if she plays a best response to y 2 , but greater than u 1 (y), and agent 1 can X -secure α 1 because r + 1 (y 2 ) ∈ B X 1 (z, α 1 ) for all z in some neighborhood U of y. If U is small enough, then z 1 / ∈ C X 1 (z, α 1 ) for all z ∈ U . If α 2 is any utility that player 2 can X -secure at y, then the game in (X , α, U )-secure at y. Now suppose that y 1 ≥ r + 1 (y * 2 ). Then y 2 = y * 2 because y 1 > y * 1 . We must have r − 2 (y 1 ) > y * 2 because if y * 1 < y ′ 1 ≤ r + 1 (y * 2 ) and r − 2 (y ′ 1 ) = y * 1 , then (y ′ 1 , y * 2 ) would be a quasiequilibrium, contrary to the definition of y * . We can choose α 2 slightly below the payoff agent 2 receives if she plays a best response to y 1 , but greater than u 2 (y), and agent 2 can X -secure α 2 because r + 2 (y 1 ) ∈ B X 2 (z, α 2 ) for all z in some neighborhood U of y. If U is small enough, then z 2 / ∈ C X 2 (z, α 2 ) for all z ∈ U . If α 1 is any utility that player 1 can X -secure at y, then the game in (X , α, U )-secure at y. This completes the proof that the game is X -secure at any y that is not an equilibrium.
The Proof of Theorem 3.3
It is not hard to show that the game is directionally secure when it has a Nash equilibrium, so we do this first. Recall that a topological space is regular if each point has a neighborhood base of closed sets. Topological vector spaces are regular topological spaces, even if they are not Hausdorff (e.g., Schaefer (1971, Lemma 1.3, p. 16) ) and it is easy to see that any subspace of a regular space is regular. Suppose x * ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium. For each i we define X i : X → X i by setting X i (x) = {x * i }. Consider an x ∈ X such that [x] does not contain a Nash equilibrium. Then [x] does not contain x * and regularity implies that X\[x] contains a closed neighborhood of x * , so x / ∈ [x * ]. Applying regularity again, there is a closed neighborhood U of x that is disjoint from [x * ]. For each i let α i = inf x ′ ∈U u i (x * i , x ′ −i ), and let α = (α 1 , . . . , α N ). Evidently each player i can X -secure α i at x. For each i and
We have shown that the game is X -secure at x.
What this argument points to is that, in practice, the value of the result is not that it gives conditions that are necessary and sufficient. Rather, it is useful to the extent that one can find restriction operators that are easily seen to satisfy the hypotheses even though the existence of equilibrium would not otherwise be obvious.
Now suppose that G is restrictionally secure, so that there is a restriction operator X such that G is X -secure at each x such that [x] does not contain a Nash equilibrium. The remainder of this section presents the proof that G has a Nash equilibrium. The following system of terminology will be useful.
Definition 5.1. If x ∈ X, U ⊂ X, and α ∈ R N , then the game G is (X , α, U )-secure at x if (1) Each player i can X -secure α i at x.
We say that the game is (X , α)-secure at x if the game is (X , α, U )-secure at x for some neighborhood U of x.
In preparation for the main body of the argument we develop several lemmas.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that α 1 , . . . , α ℓ ∈ R N and U 1 , . . . , U ℓ are neighborhoods of x, and let α = sup ℓ h=1 α h and U = ℓ h=1 U h . If, for each h = 1, . . . , ℓ, the game is (X , α h , U h )-secure at x for some α h ∈ R N and some neighborhood U h of x, then it is (X , α, U )-secure at x.
Proof. For each h and z ∈ U there are closed sets F 1 h , . . . , F J h h whose union contains U h such that for each i, j we have z∈F ℓ . In addition, for each h and z ∈ U there is some i such that z i / ∈ C X i (z, α h i ).
We claim that for each j the game is (X , α, F j )-secure at x. For any i there is some h such that α i = α h i , so for any j we have
Consider z ∈ U . For any h there is some i such that
By definition a topological space is paracompact if every open cover has an open locally finite refinement. It can be shown that every open cover of a paracompact regular topological space has a closed locally finite refinement. (e.g., Kelley (1955, Theorem 28, p. 156) .) In particular, this holds for paracompact subsets of topological vector spaces. We will say that a function f : X → R is locally finite valued if each x ∈ X has a neighborhood V such that f (V ) has finite cardinality.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that X is paracompact. If, for each x ∈ X, there is some α x ∈ R N such that the game is (X , α x )-secure at x, then there is a function ψ : X → R N , each of whose component functions ψ i : X → R is locally finite valued and upper semicontinuous, such that for each x the game is (X , ψ(x))-secure at each x ∈ X.
Proof. For each x ∈ X there is an open neighborhood U x ⊂ X such that the game is (X , α x )-secure at x. The open cover {U x : x ∈ X} has a closed locally finite refinements {F β }. That is, {F β } is a collection of closed sets whose union is X, each F β is contained in some U x , and for each point in X has a neighborhood V x for which the set {β : F β ∩ V x = ∅} is finite. For each β let α β = α x and U β = U x for some x such that F β ⊆ U x . For each x ∈ X let
Each component ψ i : X → R of ψ is upper semicontinuous and locally finite valued because {F β } is a closed locally finite cover of X. Notice that if x ∈ F β , then x ∈ U β and the game is X -secure at x for α β ∈ R N over the neighborhood U β of x. By Lemma 5.2 there is a neighborhood U of x such that the game is (X , ψ(x), U )-secure at x. Unlike Kakutani's fixed point theorem and its various infinite dimensional extensions, the following fixed point theorem holds true in topological vector spaces that are neither Hausdorff nor locally convex.
Lemma 5.4. Let X be a nonempty compact convex subset of a topological vector space and let P : X ։ X be a set valued mapping. If there is a finite closed cover G 1 , . . . , G m of X such that z∈G j P (z) = ∅ for all j = 1, . . . , m, then there exists x * ∈ X such that x * ∈ con P (x * ).
Proof. For each j = 1, . . . , m pick y j ∈ z∈G j P (z). Define the correspondence Q : X ։ X by Q(x) = con{y j : x ∈ G j }. For each x ∈ X we have x ∈ G j for some j, so
and ∅ = Q(x) ⊂ con P (x). LetX be the convex hull of y 1 , . . . , y m and let τ be the subspace topology onX induced by the unique Hausdorff linear topology on the affine hull ofX. This is at least as fine as the subspace topology ofX, so each G j ∩X is τ -closed, which implies that Q|X is upper semicontinuous. On the other handX is the convex hull of a finite set, so it is τ -compact. Applying the Kakutani fixed point theorem to Q|X gives x * ∈ Q(x * ) ⊆ con P (x * ).
We now have the tools we need to complete the proof of our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We have already shown that (b) implies (a), so it remains to show that (a) implies (b). For each i and x let P i (x) = B X i (x, ψ i (x)), and let P (x) = P 1 (x) × · · · × P N (x).
Suppose by way of contradiction that there is no Nash equilibrium. Lemma 5.3 gives a function ψ : X → R N , each of whose component functions is finite valued (because X is compact) and upper semicontinuous, such that each x is X -secure for ψ(x) over some neighborhood of x. Consider a particular x ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , N . There is a closed neighborhood U and a finite collection of closed sets F 1 , . . . , F m whose union contains U such that for each j we have z∈F j B X i (z, ψ i (x)) = ∅. Replacing U with a smaller neighborhood of need be, we may assume (because ψ i is upper semicontinuous and finite valued) that ψ i (z) ≤ ψ i (x) for all z ∈ U . We conclude for any F j we have
Since X is compact, there is a finite set of pairs (x 1 , U 1 ), . . . , (x k , U k ) such that U 1 ∪ . . . ∪ U k = X and, for each j, U j is a neighborhood of x j satisfying this description. Thus, for each i, X has a finite closed cover G i 1 , . . . , G i m i with z∈G i h P i (z) = ∅ for each h. If we let G 1 , . . . , G m be the nonempty intersections of the form G 1 j 1 ∩ . . . , ∩G N jn , then z∈G h P (z) = ∅ for each h. We see that the hypotheses of Lemma 5.4 are satisfied by P : X ։ X. This implies that there is x * ∈ X satisfying x * ∈ con P (x * ). In turn, this implies that x * i ∈ C X i (x * , ψ i (x * )) for all i. But the game is X -secure at x * for ψ(x * ), so for some i we have x * i / ∈ C X i (x * , ψ i (x * )). This is a contradiction, so the game has an equilibrium.
